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When Free Speech Isn’t Free: The Rising Costs of
Hosting Controversial Speakers at Public
Universities
Rebecca Roman†

I.

INTRODUCTION

“Free” speech seems like a misnomer when looking at the price public universities have to pay to protect students’ First Amendment rights.
Accommodating controversial speakers on campus requires universities
to balance budget constraints with free speech. Recently, universities’
obligation to provide security to people on campus and their commitment to free speech have come into conflict, resulting either in hefty
security costs or lawsuits because the law is unsettled as to who should
pay the security fees for controversial speakers.1 The potent combination of rising security costs and frequent and aggressive responses to
these controversial speakers makes this a serious First Amendment issue.2 However, trying to impose the security fees on the student groups
who invite these speakers may infringe on students’ First Amendment
rights.
Examples of this clash between free speech and financial feasibility
are easy to find. In 2017, the University of California, Berkeley spent
four million dollars on security costs and other expenses for events featuring controversial speakers like Milo Yiannopoulos and Ben Shapiro.3
†
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1
Teresa Watanabe, Q&A: UC Berkeley Chancellor Carol T. Christ: ‘Free Speech Has Itself
Become Controversial’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/education/lame-uc-berkeley-chancellor-free-speech-20170914-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/XAT2-U48W].
2
Douglas Belkin, Fear of Violent Protests Raises Cost of Free Speech on Campus, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fear-of-violent-protests-raises-cost-of-free-speech-oncampus-1508670000 [https://perma.cc/T94J-GWVX].
3
Ashley Wong, UC Berkeley Spent $4 Million on ‘Free Speech’ Events Last Year, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.dailycal.org/2018/02/04/uc-berkeley-split-4m-cost-free-
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UC Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ says such security costs are “certainly not sustainable.”4 On the other hand, UC Berkeley paid out
$70,000 to two student groups to settle a free speech suit that was filed
after the University tried to restrict speeches by two controversial
speakers.5 On the other side of the country, University of Florida
Spokeswoman Janine Sikes noted that “[p]ublic institutions cannot continue to pay this kind of money,” when discussing the $500,000 tab the
University ran up in security costs when white nationalist Richard
Spencer visited campus.6 Meanwhile, the University of Washington
paid $122,500 in legal fees in a settlement with College Republicans
after trying to make the student group pay $17,000 as a “security fee”
for costs associated with hosting a rally with the conservative group,
Patriot Prayer.7
The crux of the problem established by these examples is that there
are two incongruent yet uncompromisable interests at stake. One is the
protection of students’ First Amendment rights to free speech, and the
other is the finite budgets of universities and the money they must
spend to protect that speech. This Comment first argues that public
universities cannot impose additional security fees on student groups
who invite controversial speakers without running afoul of the First
Amendment and provides universities with constitutionally permissible alternatives to help lower security costs. Section II provides necessary background on applicable First Amendment doctrine. Section III
discusses Supreme Court precedent on fees in public forums and student speech rights in a university setting, as well as recent lower court
campus security fee cases. Finally, Section IV uses that progression of
cases to establish that imposing additional security costs on student
groups that invite controversial speakers impermissibly infringes on
students’ First Amendment rights. In light of this conclusion, Section V
lays out constitutionally permissible alternatives for universities to
manage security costs.

speech-events-uc-office-president/ [https://perma.cc/3LAF-835Q].
4
Watanabe, supra note 1.
5
Alex Morey, UC Berkeley Agrees to Pay $70k, Change Policies, in Speech Suit Settlement,
FIRE (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/uc-berkeley-agrees-to-pay-70k-change-policies-inspeech-suit-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/X2FM-SHLU].
6
Belkin, supra note 2.
7
Katherine Long, UW to Pay $122,500 in Legal Fees in Settlement with College Republicans
over Free Speech, SEATTLE TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/uwto-pay-127000-in-legal-fees-in-settlement-with-college-republicans-over-free-speech/
[https://perma.cc/WX8V-L5DM].
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
There are two foundational First Amendment issues at play in addressing the free speech implications of security fees in a university
context: public forum doctrine and the heckler’s veto.
A. Public Forum Doctrine
Public forum doctrine is an analytical tool used by courts to determine what kinds of restrictions the government can impose on speech
based on where the speech takes place. There are three types of forums
in which speech is protected to varying degrees: (1) traditional public
forums, (2) designated public forums, and (3) nonpublic forums.
Traditional public forums are those places that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,” such as parks and public streets.8 In addition to the traditional public forum, the government
can create a designated public forum by opening public property for
communicative activity.9 This second type of forum does not have to be
a public forum indefinitely, but so long as the government uses it as a
public forum, courts will treat it as such.10 Designated public forums
can be further broken down into limited and non-limited designated forums. Non-limited designated forums are not limited on who can speak
or what can be discussed.11 In contrast, a limited designated forum is a
type of designated public forum opened only for certain groups or types
of speech.12 Lastly, nonpublic forums are forums for public speech that
are not “traditional” and have not been designated a public forum by
the government.13 Examples of nonpublic forums include airport terminals, public schools’ internal mail systems, and polling places.
In a nonpublic forum, the government may apply content-based restrictions on speech, as long as the restrictions are reasonable and do
not discriminate based on speakers’ viewpoints.14 Traditional and
8

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
9
See id. at 45.
10
See id. at 46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981)).
11
Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for
Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 498
(2005).
12
See id.; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47 (“A public forum may be created
for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”).
13
See Langhauser, supra note 11, at 498.
14
See id. at 494, 503 (“Succinctly stated, ‘content’ refers broadly to the subject matter of the
speech; ‘viewpoint’ refers to the perspective from which a speaker views a particular topic—e.g.
viewing child-rearing questions from a Christian perspective; and ‘effect’ is what happens or is
likely to happen in response to the expression of that content and/or viewpoint.”) (footnote omitted)
(citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)).
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designated forums are more protective of free speech. In these forums,
content-neutral restrictions will be subject to intermediate scrutiny,
meaning they “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”15 A regulation is content neutral if it serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression.16
Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expressive activity are
generally content neutral because they do not discriminate based on the
content of the message.17 For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,18 the Supreme Court held that New York City did not run afoul of
the First Amendment when it passed a regulation on the volume of amplified music at concerts in Central Park because its purpose was to
regulate noise levels, as opposed to the content of the music.19
In traditional and designated public forums, content-based restrictions will be subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that to be upheld,
the regulation must further a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.20 While there is no precise definition
of a compelling state interest, examples include “ensuring public safety
and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks,
protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek
pregnancy-related services.”21 For a regulation to be narrowly tailored,
the regulation must promote a substantial government interest that
cannot be achieved as effectively in a less restrictive way.22 In other
words, the regulation must “not [be] substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”23 For illustration, in McCullen v. Coakley,24 the Massachusetts state legislature sought to protect
its interest in public safety and patient access to reproductive health
care by making it a crime to “knowingly stand on a ‘public way or

15

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
Id. at 791.
17
Id.
18
491 U.S. 781.
19
See id. at 792.
20
See Langhauser, supra note 11, at 502.
21
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486–87 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Schenck v. ProChoice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin
of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 398 (2006).
But see Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, MTSU (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest [https://perma.cc/CEX4-DV74] (“An interest is
compelling when it is essential or necessary rather than a matter of choice, preference, or discretion.”).
22
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
23
Id.
24
573 U.S. 464 (2014).
16
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sidewalk’ within 35 feet” of an abortion clinic.25 The Supreme Court held
that the statute was not narrowly tailored because the “buffer zones”
burdened significantly more speech than was necessary to achieve the
asserted state interests.26 In fact, the Court found that another provision in the same statute protected the state’s interests as effectively in
a less restrictive way, by making it a crime to knowingly impede “another person’s entry to or exit from a reproductive health care facility.”27
In sum, content-based restrictions on speech in public forums will
be subject to strict scrutiny review, while restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums will only face intermediate scrutiny. Section III will establish that universities contain a variety of public and nonpublic forums. For example, a classroom is not a public forum,28 but a student
activity fee often is a public forum, albeit a “metaphysical” one.29
B. The Heckler’s Veto
The heckler’s veto pertains to restrictions placed on speech by the
government in response to an audience’s reaction or expected reaction.
A heckler’s veto is an “impermissible content-based restriction on
speech where the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly
or violent reaction of the audience.”30 The Supreme Court has held that
a speaker should not be silenced because of a hostile audience, and
many courts have imposed affirmative obligations on the state to provide for the security of controversial speakers in public forums.31
The government’s obligation to protect and promote unpopular
speech in a typical heckler’s veto case is not without limit. First, speech
protections only apply to protected speech; that is, certain categories of
speech do not qualify for First Amendment—and therefore government—protection. For example, speech that amounts to incitement of
violence would not be protected, even in a traditional public forum.32
25

Id. at 469, 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 490.
27
See id. at 490–91.
28
See Bishop v. Arnov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991).
29
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
30
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
31
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (“Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend
a hostile mob.”); see also Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The police
must permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s veto.”) (quoting Hedges v.
Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993)); Grider v. Abramson,
994 F. Supp. 840, 845–46 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (“The police were not at liberty to do nothing; authorities
had to develop some way of allowing the rallies to proceed while at the same time protecting those
participating.”), aff’d, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1999).
32
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (establishing that speech advocating illegal conduct is protected under the First Amendment unless the speech is likely to incite
26
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Additionally, “the law does not expect or require [the police] to defend
the right of a speaker to address a hostile audience, however large and
intemperate, when to do so would unreasonably subject them to violent
retaliation and physical injury.”33 With this background in mind, this
Comment argues that universities that impose additional security fees
on student groups who invite controversial speakers are engaging in a
de facto heckler’s veto by imposing these additional costs due to audiences’ reactions.
III. PROGRESSION OF CASES
There are two series of cases implicated by the question of who
should pay security fees required to host controversial speakers on campus. The first outlines when security fees can be charged in certain public forums. The second outlines the relationship between universities
and student speech. This Comment argues that these two series of cases
fit together to establish that when universities establish a designated
public forum, imposing additional security costs on student groups who
invite controversial speakers to campus constitutes an infringement on
students’ First Amendment rights. The recent security fee cases in Subsection C illustrate that some courts have adopted this conclusion.
A. Fees and Permits in Public Forums
The government must protect controversial speakers in traditional public forums and may not charge speakers for increased security costs based on audience reaction to their controversial speech.34
However, the Supreme Court has held that regulations regarding the
use of public forums that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not inconsistent with the First Amendment, so long as they do
not give the government too much discretion.35 In Cox v. New Hampshire36 the Supreme Court upheld a statute that required organizers
to obtain a special license before putting on a demonstration in a public forum.37 The statute authorized a municipality to charge a permit
fee for the “maintenance of public order” of up to $300.38 The Court
held that it was constitutional to charge a fee limited to the purpose of

“imminent lawless action”).
33
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 909 (6th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds
by Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015).
34
See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 135–36.
35
See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
36
312 U.S. 569.
37
Id. at 575–78.
38
Id. at 576–77.
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meeting the expense of administering the licensing act and maintaining public order.39 The Court went so far as to state that:
[t]he suggestion that a flat fee should have been charged fails to
take account of the difficulty of framing a fair schedule to meet
all circumstances, and we perceive no constitutional ground for
denying to local governments that flexibility of adjustment of
fees which in the light of varying conditions would tend to conserve rather than impair the liberty sought.40
In contrast to Cox, the Supreme Court has also held that a similar ordinance allowing county commissioners to assess a fee of up to $1,000
per day was unconstitutional because it gave a county administrator
too much discretion to determine how much to charge.41 In Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement,42 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “the constitutionality of charging a fee for a speaker
in a public forum.”43 As a result of demonstrations that led to unrest in
a small rural county, commissioners enacted an ordinance that required
a permit and a fee to be paid in advance of any event.44 The fee was to
be determined as needed to “meet the expense incident to the administration of the ordinance and to the maintenance of public order,” but
was capped at $1,000.45 The commissioners wanted to impose some of
the increased security costs on the demonstrators because the provision
of “necessary and reasonable protection” to participants in these
demonstrations “exceed[ed] the usual and normal cost of law enforcement.”46 When the plaintiffs proposed a demonstration a few years
later, the county imposed a $100 fee for the permit.47 The plaintiffs sued
claiming the fee infringed on their First Amendment rights.48
In a public forum, content-based regulations of speech must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.”49 In Forsyth, the ordinance imposing a fee based on audience reaction was content-based because “[t]hose wishing to express views unpopular with

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 577.
Id.
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992).
505 U.S. 123.
Id. at 129.
See id. at 130.
Id. at 126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 134–35 (1992).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
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bottle throwers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit.”50
Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court found that the statute was
not narrowly tailored because there were no “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards guiding the hand of the Forsyth County administrator.”51 Specifically, the administrator did not have to rely on
objective factors or explain his unreviewable decision; therefore, a biased administrator could use the fees as a form of censorship.52 The uncontrolled discretion of the ordinance permitted a content-based metric
for assessing security fees.53 Thus, it invalidated the ordinance.54
The language of the regulations in Cox and Forsyth are hard to distinguish, making the outcomes hard to reconcile.55 The Forsyth Court
did not overrule Cox, but stated it did not read Cox to permit a state
entity to charge controversial speakers a premium due to hostile audience reaction.56 While this explanation fails to explain how such similar
language can be read in opposite ways, it makes clear that the Supreme
Court would not permit a premium to be charged to controversial speakers going forward.
The Supreme Court recently upheld a content-neutral permit system that allowed for permit seekers to be excluded if the exclusion
helped preserve park facilities, prevented dangerous uses of forums,
and assured financial accountability for damage caused by an event.57
In Thomas v. Chicago Park District,58 a park ordinance required individuals to obtain a permit before hosting events of more than fifty people.59 The ordinance listed reasons why the Park District could deny an
application for a permit, including that “the applicant has not tendered
the required application fee,” “the applicant . . . has on prior occasions
damaged Park District property and has not paid in full for such damage,” and “the use or activity intended by the applicant would present
an unreasonable danger to the health or safety of the applicant, or other
users of the park, of Park District Employees or of the public.”60

50

Id. at 134 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989)).
Id. at 133 (internal citations omitted).
52
Id. at 133–34.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 137.
55
Compare id. at 126–27 (the fee was to be determined as needed to “meet the expense incident to the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public order”), with Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1941) (the statute authorized a municipality to charge a
permit fee for the “maintenance of public order” of up to $300).
56
Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 136.
57
See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002).
58
534 U.S. 316.
59
Id. at 322.
60
Id. at 318 n.1.
51
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Although mere time, place, and manner restrictions can be applied in a
discriminatory way by giving too much discretion to park officials, there
was no fear that an official would grant or deny a permit based on its
content under the ordinance in this case.61 The Park District could only
deny a permit for one of the reasons set forth in the ordinance, and the
Court found those grounds to be “reasonably specific and objective, and
[did] not leave the decision ‘to the whim of the administrator.’”62 Together, Cox, Forsyth, and Thomas illustrate that, in traditional public
forums, permits and fees must be assessed in an objective and content
neutral way and speakers cannot be excluded or surcharged based on
the content of their speech (lest the regulation be subject to strict scrutiny).
B. Universities and Students’ First Amendment Rights
Students enjoy the constitutional protections of the First Amendment in a university setting.63 Though the Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of the state and of school officials to “prescribe
and control conduct in the schools,”64 it has held that First Amendment
protections are “nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”65 It is important to note that this Comment addresses the First
Amendment rights of students at public universities because the First
Amendment only applies to government actors.66 Although many private universities protect student speech with commendable commitment, those institutions are not bound by the First Amendment.67 However, there are many reasons why private universities should adhere to
First Amendment principles.68 Thus, this Comment may be applicable
to private universities committed to protecting free speech as well.
61

Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324 (“They provide ‘narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards’ to guide the
licensor’s determination.”) (quoting Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(1992)).
63
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room
for the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large.”).
64
Id.
65
Id. (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas . . . .’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Of course, there are many cases that cabin this broad pronouncement and allow school administrators to restrict speech on campuses. See generally JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
(2018).
66
See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) (“[W]hen
a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the
First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor.”).
67
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS xi (2017) (“We
recognize, of course, that the First Amendment applies only to public colleges and universities.”).
68
Aside from the benefits generally associated with the First Amendment, like the sharing of
62
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The cases that set the parameters for a university’s ability to interfere with students’ First Amendment rights arose in the context of student group recognition. The following cases established that universities provide limited public forums to registered student organizations
and that universities cannot deny these student organizations access to
those forums based on a group’s viewpoints.
Denial of official recognition of a student organization, without sufficient justification, violates students’ First Amendment right of association.69 In Healy v. James,70 the Supreme Court held that a public educational institution exceeds constitutional bounds when it “restrict[s]
speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by [a]
group to be abhorrent.”71 The Court further held that the denial of official recognition to a student group without justification unconstitutionally impedes a group’s ability to associate by denying access to campus
resources.72
Using the same logic as in Healy, the Supreme Court has made
clear that universities cannot allow some groups to use campus resources but deny others based on the content of their messages.73 In
Widmar v. Vincent,74 a state university was sued by a religious student
group that was denied access to campus facilities because of a regulation that prohibited the use of school property for religious purposes in
an attempt to avoid state support for religion.75 The Court held that the
University had rendered itself a limited public forum by holding itself
open for use by student groups.76 Relying on Healy, the Supreme Court
reiterated that students have a right to free speech on campus and that
the withholding of campus resources is a form of prior restraint, subject
to strict scrutiny.77 The Court held that the regulation was invalid because it was a content-based regulation on religious activity and the
University could not show that regulation of that activity was necessary

ideas, President Trump issued an executive order directed at both public and private universities
urging them to protect free speech on campus or risk losing federal funds. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Trump Signs Broad Executive Order, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/03/22/white-house-executive-order-prods-colleges-free-speech-program-level-data-and-risk [https://perma.cc/BQ2P-UQ4Q].
69
See Healy, 408 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he freedom of association is . . . implicit in the freedoms of
speech, assembly, and petition.”).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 187–88.
72
Id. at 181.
73
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
74
454 U.S. 263.
75
Id. 265–66.
76
Id. at 267–68, 272.
77
Id. at 267 n.5.
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to serve a compelling interest or that the regulation itself was narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.78
Similarly, universities cannot fund the speech of some groups but
not others based on viewpoints.79 Though it often authorized the payment of printing costs for student publications, the University in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia80 denied printing costs to a student group’s newspaper on the ground that it promoted
religious beliefs.81 The Supreme Court held that the University had created a limited public forum by enacting a policy of providing funding for
the printing costs of student publications and that the denial of funding
for the plaintiffs’ publication involved unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, violating the students’ First Amendment rights.82 It did
not matter that that the University was denying funding for speech as
opposed to a platform for speech, as in Widmar.83
Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberg establish that the “First Amendment generally precludes public universities from denying student organizations access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups’
viewpoints.”84 It may be permissible, however, to deny a student group
access to campus resources if the resources are a subsidy and withholding access would not constitute a prior restraint on free speech. At issue
in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez85 was the constitutionality of a
university policy that required registered student organizations to accept an “all-comers” policy to allow all students to participate in any
student organization.86 A student group sued the University after they
were rejected as a registered student organization (“RSO”) for refusing
to comply with the all-comers policy.87 The Court deemed the RSO program a limited public forum, such that it could only impose restrictions
on speech that were reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and
viewpoint neutral.88 Unlike earlier cases, the Supreme Court characterized the denial of school resources to student organizations as denial of
a subsidy, as opposed to a prior restraint.89 In doing so, it forewent an
78

Id. at 270, 276.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 827.
82
Id. at 831.
83
Id. at 832–33 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276).
84
Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667–68 (2010) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
819; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)).
85
561 U.S. 661.
86
Id. at 668.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 679 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).
89
Id. at 683.
79
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analysis of the regulation under strict scrutiny, opting instead for the
“less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis.”90
The Martinez Court ultimately held that the all-comers policy did
not violate the students’ First Amendment rights because the policy
was a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral condition on RSO status.91 The
policy was considered reasonable because it comported with the limited
forum’s purpose to bring together individuals with “diverse backgrounds and beliefs, encourage[ing] tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.”92 The all-comers policy was also viewpoint neutral
because the policy drew no distinction between groups based on their
message or perspective.93 Additionally, even without official recognition, the group had access to alternative channels, such as access to
school facilities and advertising mechanisms.94
On a related note, in furtherance of free speech, universities may
impose a mandatory fee to sustain open dialogues on campus so long as
the allocation of funding to student groups is viewpoint neutral.95 In
Board of Regents v. Southworth,96 a group of students tried to challenge
a mandatory student fee policy at their university, claiming it violated
their First Amendment rights because the fee was used to fund speech
with which plaintiffs did not agree.97 The University collected the activity fee to “facilitate[] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among,
its students.”98 The Court held it was constitutionally permissible to
collect a fee for that purpose, so long as it protected students’ First
Amendment interests by allocating those funds to student groups in a
viewpoint neutral way.99
The cases in this section paved the way for the recent security fee
cases to be decided—and more commonly, settled—by ascertaining that
universities offer a number of limited public forums. These cases show
that when universities establish such forums, courts will step in to ensure that all students’ speech rights are protected equally. However,
courts have left open the question of how this precedent applies in the
context of imposing security costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus.
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Id.
Id. at 697
Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 690.
See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–30 (2000).
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Id. at 221.
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C. Recent Campus Security Fee Cases
Professor Erica Goldberg has advocated that courts should apply a
Forsyth analysis—requiring a court to determine whether a fee structure gives administrators “unbridled discretion” and whether the structure is content neutral—to universities when assessing the constitutionality of security fees.100 She also recommended that universities
create a separate fund for extra security, rather than asking students
or the speaker to pay.101 Since her article was published in 2011, a number of cases have addressed the constitutionality of imposing security
costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers, though most
have been resolved by a settlement rather than a judgement.
While there is no Supreme Court judgment dealing with security
fee allocation for speakers invited by students, the Court has made clear
that a fee policy that gives a state actor too much discretion to determine security costs will be held unconstitutional.102 With this idea in
the background, the Fifth Circuit decided Sonnier v. Crain,103 in which
an uninvited, non-student speaker sued the Southeastern Louisiana
University to enjoin enforcement of the speech policy regulating speech
by non-students on campus and imposing security fees.104 The fee policy
stated that the “sponsoring individual(s) or organization(s) [would be]
responsible for the cost of . . . security beyond that normally provided
by the University.”105 The speaker claimed that the speech policy violated the First Amendment because it gave the University “sole discretion . . . in determining both the need for, and the strength of the security” and would impute any additional costs on the sponsoring
individual or organization.106 Relying on Forsyth, the Court struck down
the policy because it gave the University “unbridled discretion” to determine the security fee.107
When a university gives itself broad discretion to determine security costs for hosting speakers on campus, the underlying regulation
will likely be held unconstitutional. In an order granting the student
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, a federal district
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Erica Goldberg, Must Universities “Subsidize” Controversial Ideas?: Allocating Security
Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349, 395–96
(2011).
101
Id. at 403.
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See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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613 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion withdrawn in part on reh’g, 634 F.3d 778 (5th Cir.
2011).
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Id. at 438.
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Id. at 440 n.4.
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Id. at 447.
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Id. at 447–48.
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court recently applied Forsyth in the context of a security fee for a controversial speaker invited to campus by a student group.108 In College
Republicans v. Cauce,109 a student group sought to bring a controversial
speaker to campus for a “Freedom Rally.”110 The University’s event policy required student organizations to pay the anticipated costs of security for on-campus events.111 For the rally, the University determined
that it needed enhanced security based on the time and location of the
event, how many people were estimated to attend the event, and audience responses to the controversial speaker at prior events.112 The University therefore demanded a $17,000 reimbursement from the
group.113 The student group filed suit claiming the fee policy violated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “regulating the student organization’s expression based on its conservative viewpoints and
the potential reaction of those who oppose [the speaker].”114
In reaching its conclusion in Cauce, the court relied on Forsyth,
finding that the security fee policy at issue was neither reasonable nor
viewpoint neutral because it gave administrators “broad discretion to
determine how much to charge student organizations for enhanced security, or whether to charge at all.”115 The court noted that the amount
of the fee would “depend on the administrator’s measure of the amount
of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content.”116
The policy also failed because the fees were assessed based on “history
or examples of violence, bodily harm, property damage, significant disruption of campus operations and violations of the campus code of conduct and state and federal law.”117 The court feared this would lead administrators to “inevitably impose elevated fees for events featuring
speech that is controversial or provocative and likely to draw opposition.”118 This case was resolved when the parties agreed to a settlement—with the University agreeing to pay $122,500 in legal fees to the
College Republicans’ attorneys and agreeing to rescind the security fee
policy for student group events.119 Though the University decided it
108

See Coll. Republicans v. Cauce, No. C18-189-MJP, 2018 WL 804497, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
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would no longer charge student groups a security fee for speakers, the
settlement did not preclude the University from “creating a constitutionally permissible security fee for student events” in the future.120
In another recent case on security fees for invited speakers, a California district court allowed a student group to proceed on an Equal
Protection claim against its university for imposing a security fee that
was much higher than it had been for other similarly situated events.121
In Young American’s Foundation v. Napolitano,122 a registered student
organization had organized an on-campus speaking engagement featuring Milo Yiannopoulos, a controversial conservative figure.123 The university cancelled the Yiannopoulos event when protests turned violent.124
In response to this event, University officials instituted policies
that put restrictions on the student organization’s subsequent speaking
engagements featuring controversial figures.125 Under the policies, the
University charged a $5,788 security fee for one of its events.126 For another event, the University imposed a $15,738 security fee, later reduced to $9,162.127 The reduced fee was still almost twice as much as
the fee charged for an event featuring Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor in the same facility, with more people, and with access to a
larger part of the facility.128
The court in Napolitano ultimately found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an Equal Protection Clause violation, based on the imposition of an unreasonable fee.129 Relying on Cox, the court noted that
“with regard to security fees, government officials may . . . properly impose fees consistent with the First Amendment.”130 However, the court
was not convinced that the fees in this case were reasonable, stating
that, “[i]n the absence of a pleaded explanation for any of the fees imposed, and where, as here, an explanation is not otherwise apparent, such allegations suffice to support an as-applied challenge” to the
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policies.131 This case was resolved when the plaintiffs settled with UC
Berkeley for $70,000 to cover the plaintiff’s attorney costs, as well as a
revision of the campus policies for hosting speakers.132 The school noted
that the settlement was not a concession that the policies allowed for
viewpoint discrimination.133
These recent security fee cases show that courts have tended to find
the imposition of additional security fees on student groups who invite
controversial speakers to be problematic, if not unconstitutional. Given
the trend of universities settling these cases, universities may even
agree.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPOSITION OF FEES
None of the First Amendment case law directly precludes a university from charging security fees; however, the fees must comport with
constitutional requirements of content neutrality, lest they be subject
to strict scrutiny. The cases discussed in Section III demonstrate that
any fees based on audience reaction to a controversial speaker must
pass strict scrutiny to avoid violating the First Amendment because audience reaction is not a content neutral way to assess fees.134
Professor Goldberg looked to some of the cases discussed in this
Comment to address whether “[p]ublic universities should adopt clearly
articulated policies that conform to Forsyth, Southworth, and their
progeny to ensure that administrators do not punish unpopular views
or assess speaker’s fees based on controversial content.”135 She articulated the basic elements of a constitutional security fee as: “(1) riskneutral and content-neutral standards for determining security fees; (2)
explicit guidelines on how those fees are determined; and (3) a transparent process for student groups to appeal security fees that are larger
than normal.”136 The problem is, assigning additional security costs to
student groups who invite speakers who elicit violent reactions from
protestors will necessarily fail prong (1) of this test.
With foresight, Professor Goldberg’s article argued for extending
Forsyth to apply in the limited public forum context of a university
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setting.137 This not only complies with Supreme Court precedent,138 but
lower courts have also adopted this approach. The court in Cauce followed this approach when it relied on Forsyth to determine a security
fee was unconstitutional.139 However, in Napolitano, another federal
district court relied on Cox to hold that government officials can impose
security fees, consistent with the First Amendment.140 The court in Napolitano did not find the policy to be unconstitutional itself, but was
concerned that the security fee was being imposed inconsistently.141 The
fee policy itself may have been the issue, or it could have been that the
policy was applied incorrectly, leading to the inconsistencies. It is hard
to know, because in both of these district court cases, the parties settled
before the courts resolved the controversies.142 The Court in Forsyth
stated that the difference in the fee policy invalidated in Forsyth and
the fee upheld in Cox was that, in Forsyth, the county could impose an
increased security fee in anticipation of a hostile audience.143 However,
there did not seem to be any real difference in the discretion given to
the government in either case.144
Given the importance of the exchange of ideas on campus and the
constitutional protection of students’ speech, the cases discussed in Section III.B demonstrate that courts will not allow universities to charge
student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus more for
the security costs that they charge for other speakers. Additionally, a
security fee structure that would allow a university to impose a security
fee within a permissible range would not be workable. Given the exorbitant costs of security for these events, the range would be huge (e.g.,
a range from $0 to $500,000, in case Richard Spencer visits).145 Not only
would additional costs be unpayable by most student groups, but a
range that spans thousands of dollars leaves more room for arbitrary
enforcement than even the $1,000 range invalidated in Forsyth.
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Universities might try to avoid hosting certain controversial speakers altogether by relying on Thomas, in which a park district did not
violate the First Amendment by denying access to its facilities based on
an ordinance that was “reasonably specific and objective.”146 It is conceivable that a university could set up a policy very similar to that in
Thomas by requiring permits for invited speakers and making the permits subject to a set of limitations that would to allow it to withhold a
permit in cases of danger.147 Given case law in university settings, it is
clear that universities cannot discriminate based on student organizations’ viewpoints, which also precludes discrimination based on predicted audience reactions.148 When Richard Spencer rented space from
the University of Florida, the University was able to cancel his first reservation because there were imminent and legitimate dangers that it
could point to.149 However, the University acquiesced that absent extenuating circumstances, it was obligated to allow him use of the University as a public forum.150 Whether relying on Forsyth, Cox, or Thomas,
assigning additional security costs to student groups who invite controversial speakers will trigger strict scrutiny review, and the speakers
cannot be turned away simply because of a hostile audience.
V.

OTHER WAYS OF MANAGING SECURITY COSTS

Since public universities may not impose extra security fees on student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus and the costs
stemming from hosting these speakers are becoming unmanageable,
universities must figure out other ways to defray these costs.151 In light
of the analysis above, this section will address potential ways universities can decrease security costs that do not involve impermissible impositions of additional fees on student groups.
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A. Use Martinez to Argue that Security Fee Allotments are a
Subsidy
The most interesting approach a university might take to limit its
security expenses would require it to change the student fee structure
so that every RSO receives a set budget from the school to fund everything from printing newspapers to, say, covering the costs of security
fees to host a controversial speaker. Universities may also try to set a
baseline amount of money for security per event, available for all student groups, and any costs beyond that amount would be imposed on
the group inviting the speaker or hosting the event.152 A university
might be able to frame the both the RSO budgets or the security fee as
a subsidy and support their position along the same lines as the rationale in Martinez.153 First, the Martinez Court framed access to school
resources as a subsidy whereas, in the past, the Supreme Court had
framed the issue as one of prior restraint.154 In the past, courts viewed
withholding student group recognition as a prior restraint on speech it
limited their access to a limited public forum.155 A university might try
to argue that it is not withholding additional funding based on audience
reaction, but that it is giving something equally to all student groups.
Second, the all-comers policy in Martinez was determined to be “textbook viewpoint neutral” because it applied to everyone.156 While the
amount of money allotted to each student group would be equal, this
approach would likely still be seen as a prior restraint on speech, because student groups that cannot afford to cover additional security fees
for their speakers would not be able to invite them.157
B. Educate and Train Students Before Conflicts Arise
Universities can institute First Amendment education and/or
training for students, similar to that used for Title IX training.158
152
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Informing students in a direct and clear way of the importance of free
speech on campus and outlining responses to speakers with whom students do not agree may lead to more tolerance on campus. While the
University of Florida did spend over $500,000 when Richard Spencer
came to campus, the protests did not rise to the level of those at UC
Berkeley, which paid similarly large security fees for a similar event.159
One reason for this may be the way the University of Florida handled
the event. The University took a direct and transparent approach to
hosting Richard Spencer, who was not invited by a student group,160 by
dedicating a webpage which explained their responsibilities under the
First Amendment161 and advocated that students not give Spencer the
spotlight by staying away from the event.162 The University of Florida
made clear the reasons Spencer was coming to campus and how much
he paid to rent the space.163 In short, universities can reduce spikes in
security costs by investing in both conflict prevention geared towards
the event and general tolerance education.
The University of Chicago provides another example of a university
clearly stating expectations for student conduct.164 In 2016, the private
university sent a letter to all incoming freshmen informing them of the
University’s commitment to free speech and its refusal to compromise
on its values.165 When former chairman of a conservative media outlet
and Trump advisor Steve Bannon was invited to campus in 2018, protests erupted but did not escalate to violence, though Bannon never set
a date to speak.166 Additionally, the University of Chicago serves as an
ix-training-mandatory/ [https://perma.cc/FQ2W-FGWF].
159
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example of general tolerance education: the University sought to design
a more robust education program to educate students on the rights and
responsibilities that come with participating in the university community, including “targeted outreach measures for students and recognized student organizations, which build on existing student-centered
programs and resources but are coordinated by the Office of Campus
and Student Life and developed with the faculty.”167
C. Institute Physical Security Best Practices
Universities can institute best practices in securing these events to
decrease costs. Some have questioned whether the security fees for
these events needed to be as high as they were. For example, Ben
Shapiro’s visit to the University of Tennessee cost the University less
than $4,000, in sharp contrast with the hundreds of thousands spent by
other universities.168 To prepare for the event, the University instituted
a “clear bag policy” for attendees, prohibited signs and large bags, and
did not allow for re-admittance to the event.169 Similarly, the University
of Florida was credited for its successful strategy of separating Spencer’s supporters from protestors with physical barriers.170 As universities cannot pass on increased costs of security due to audience response
to a controversial speaker, they would be well-advised to consider instituting measures like these to help decrease their security costs.
D. More Aggressive University Response to Hecklers
Universities may decide to crack down harder on disruptive protestors to discourage conduct that infringes on the speech rights of others.
In 2017, the University of Chicago formed a committee to look into what
could be done about disruptive conduct on campus in response to controversial speakers.171 The committee recommended that the University work to reduce the chances that disrupters prevent others from
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speaking by instituting a “free speech deans on call” program that
would allow for the designation and training of faculty to deal with disruptive conduct as it happens.172 The centralized punishment apparatus would be made up of five members consisting of faculty and students and dole out punishment on a case-by-case basis.173 Punishment
need not be harsh to be effective, but punishing disrupters more seriously could lead to a decrease in disruptive activity for fear of repercussions. However, the speaker and the protestor have a First Amendment
right to free speech. The issue addressed by this Comment is the high
costs of security for controversial speakers given a hostile audience reaction. The goal is not to prevent protests but to ensure both the rights
of the speaker and the protester are protected. To help ensure that the
rights of protestors are protected, the University of Chicago committee
gave examples of what would constitute “disruptive”174 and “nondisruptive”175 conduct to ensure students would know they still have the ability to protest speakers with whom they disagree.
The heart of the problem addressed by this Comment is the conduct
of hecklers on campus, not the hecklees. Imposing additional security
costs on student groups who invite controversial speakers can make it
cost prohibitive for their voices to be heard. But, it should not be overlooked that there are important speech interests on both sides. The solutions discussed in this Section attempt to balance the rights of a
speaker with dissenters’ rights to object. Both parties have a right to
free speech and these solutions attempt to protect both parties’ speech
interests.
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are a number of counterarguments to the conclusion that
universities cannot impose additional security fees onto the student
groups who invite controversial speakers to campus. Most of the counterarguments suggest approaches that target a speaker’s ability to
speak in the first place. Whether a university can exclude these speakers altogether plays into the issue of security fees because there is a fear
that putting the security costs on the speaker or, in this case, the student group who invites the speaker, will chill speech if the student
Id.
Id.
174
Id. (“Disruptive protests . . . include blocking access to an event or to a university facility
and shouting or otherwise interrupting an event or other university activity with noise in a way
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group cannot afford the fees.176 Because these speakers cannot be excluded based on audience reaction, this Section will show that the counterarguments cannot resolve the question of who should pay the
speaker fees.
A. Students’ Free Speech Rights are Not Being Infringed Upon
One might argue that students’ free speech rights are not implicated when a university imposes security costs on a student group who
invites an outside speaker. The argument would be that the speaker’s
rights are stifled, but not the rights of the students who invited the
speaker. Professor Goldberg persuasively argues that students’ free
speech rights are implicated in a number of ways. First, the fees infringe on a student group’s First Amendment right to receive information.177 Further, the non-student speech is attributable to the student group who invited the speaker, and the “extra security fees are a
burden on the student group’s speech in the same way as denying a
student organization funding to publish its religious newspaper.”178 Although the imposition of security fees do not prevent students themselves from speaking, their free speech rights are impeded nonetheless
when they cannot afford to invite speakers to campus.
B. Controversial Speakers Should Not be Brought to Campus
Another foreseeable counterargument is that nobody should pay
the security fees because these controversial speakers should not be invited to campus in the first place. This argument would be strong-er
against speakers like Richard Spencer or Milo Yiannopoulos, who are
widely considered to be more showmen than speakers of sub-stance.
The speech being offered may not seem to contribute to civil discourse,
however, the First Amendment protects even hateful and offensive
speech179
A stronger argument for excluding these speakers comes from Professor Robert Post of Yale University, who argues that there is no First
Amendment right to free speech on university campuses.180 If he is
176
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correct, then the solution to the escalating costs of security fees can be
avoided by preventing the controversial speakers from coming to campus in the first place. Professor Post argues that universities’ dual missions of “education and the creation of knowledge” take them outside
the realm of public discourse and therefore, allow universities to engage
in content discrimination.181 In support of his argument, he lists examples of this acceptable “content discrimination”: professors are prohibited from engaging in personal abuse of their students, professors hired
to teach mathematics must teach mathematics, and professors engage
in content discrimination when grading exams.182 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of UC Berkeley published a response to Professor Post’s article,
saying that Professor Post argues for what he thinks that law should
be, instead of what the law is.183 Dean Chemerinsky points out the fatal
flaw in Professor Post’s argument: the idea that because free speech
principles do not always apply on campus, they can never apply.184
When a public university creates a limited public forum, it does not follow that the entire university becomes a public forum.185 As described
in Section III, the law is on Dean Chemerinsky’s side.186
C. It Is A Waste of Money to Host Controversial Speakers
One might also argue that the huge security costs required to host
these speakers are a waste of money for everyone involved because it is
so rare these speakers even get to actually speak. “Shouting down” controversial speakers has become a common response to speakers on campus, in which the speaker has a platform but cannot convey his message.187 This Comment does not argue that universities will always be
successful in protecting First Amendment rights, but the fact that it is
difficult to protect free speech rights does not mean universities do not
have the responsibility to try. Instituting some of the solutions
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181
Id.
182
Id. Professor Post states: “I subject my students to constant content discrimination. If I am
teaching a course on constitutional law, my students had better discuss constitutional law and not
the World Series.” Id.
183
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech is Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses,
VOX (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speechfirst-amendment-protest [https://perma.cc/BCT9-JN55].
184
Id.
185
Compare Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976–77 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a university classroom is a non-public forum), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (holding that the university had created a limited public forum by funding
the printing costs of student publications).
186
See supra Section III.B.
187
Charles S. Nary, The New Heckler’s Veto: Shouting Down Speech on University Campuses,
21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 306 (2018).

451]

WHEN FREE SPEECH ISN’T FREE

475

described in Section V may not only lower security costs to the university, but may also increase the likelihood these speakers can actually
use the platform the university is protecting.188
VII. CONCLUSION
The University of Florida had to pay $500,000 for security when
Richard Spencer came to the campus, uninvited.189 If a university has
to foot the bill when speakers are not invited to campus by student
groups, the justifications for requiring them to pay the security fees are
even stronger when students are actually interested in what a speaker
has to say.190 On the other hand, if universities do not find a way to get
security fees under control, the community could lose out on the university as a forum altogether. The line of cases about the relationshipbetween universities and students makes it clear that universities provide limited designated public forums for students to invite speakers.191
These designated public forums are only treated as such as long as they
are open to the public.192 Universities may decide the costs are too high
to allow outside speakers in if they are consistently having to pay millions of dollars per year on security fees alone. While it may be the case
that less harm would come to speech on campus by charging a fee as
opposed to not having speakers on campus altogether, the First Amendment forbids universities from imposing additional security costs onto
the student groups who invite controversial speakers to campus. In an
effort to preserve the university as a marketplace of ideas that universities have come to serve as, universities and scholars must continue to
develop methods of coping with exorbitant security costs when controversial speakers come to campus.
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